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ABSTRACT
Nonverbally-expressed emotions are not always linked to people’s true 
emotions. We investigated whether observers’ ability to distinguish 
trues from lies differs for positive and negative emotional expressions. 
Participants judged targets either simulating or truly experiencing 
positive or negative emotions. Deception detection was measured 
by participants’ inference of the targets’ emotions and their direct 
judgments of deception. Results of the direct measure showed that 
participants could not accurately distinguish between truth tellers 
and liars, regardless which emotion was expressed. As anticipated, 
the effects emerged on the indirect emotion measure: participants 
distinguished liars from truth tellers when inferring experienced 
emotions from negative emotional expressions, but not positive 
emotional expressions.
Nonverbally expressed emotions do not always reflect people’s true emotions. People may 
simulate a smile when receiving a gift they are disappointed about. Bargainers may simulate 
anger to get what they want in a negotiation. Examples such as these indicate that people 
may deliberately and strategically try to influence others by misrepresenting their emotions 
(Li & Roloff, 2006). We investigated whether people are able to detect whether or not others 
deceive or truthfully show their emotions.
Detecting deception
Research on detecting deception indicates that people are generally not good in detect-
ing deception; deception often remains undetected (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & 
Epstein, 1996) and when explicitly asked whether a person is deceiving or not, accuracy 
rates of detecting deception are not far above chance level (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Vrij, 
2000). Many explanations for the inability to detect lies have been suggested (e.g., Levine 
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et al., 2011; O’Sullivan, 2003). One explanation is that people tend to believe rather than 
disbelieve information that is being presented (McCornack & Parks, 1986).
Research on nonverbal behavior adds another explanation for the inability to detect lies: 
People have inaccurate beliefs about cues to deception (Ekman, 2001; Vrij, 2000). Strömwall, 
Granhag, and Hartwig (2004) and Vrij (2008) conclude that people generally believe that 
liars show nervous behaviors, like excessive displays of movements, gaze aversion, smiles, 
and eye blinking. In reality, however, most liars show decreases in finger, hand, foot, and 
leg movements and use fewer illustrators than truth tellers (e.g., Vrij, 2000). In addition, 
gaze aversion, smiles, and eye blinking are not or only weakly related to deceptive behav-
ior (DePaulo, 1988; Hartwig & Bond, 2011; Vrij, 2000). Another issue that laypeople are 
generally unaware of, is that facial expressions of emotional liars and truth tellers differ in 
the muscles that are activated and in the intensity, duration, laterality, and timing of this 
activation (Ekman, Hager, & Friesen, 1981; Hill & Craig, 2002).
The meta-analysis by Hartwig and Bond (2011) suggests, however, that failure to detect 
lies may not be caused by reliance on false beliefs about lying. Rather, people tend to rely 
on cues that weakly predict deception. Thus, Hartwig and Bond concluded that people are 
bad at detecting lies because of the weakness of behavioral cues to recognize a liar. In the 
present article, we examine whether people can correctly infer emotions from deceptive 
nonverbal emotional expressions, i.e., whether they can distinguish lies from truths when 
assessing emotions.
Detecting deception from emotional expressions
Evidence regarding the ability to distinguish between true and deceptive positive emotions 
is mixed. On the one hand, the emotional labor literature suggests that observers can dis-
tinguish smiles expressed while truly experiencing happiness from smiles expressed while 
not experiencing happiness. For instance, Groth, Hennig-Thurau, and Walsh (2009) showed 
that people who are required to smile a lot during service-related jobs are less positively 
evaluated when they engage in surface level acting (e.g., displaying a smile while not expe-
riencing happiness) than when they engage in deep-level acting (i.e., attempting to generate 
happiness so that the displayed smile is real).
Comparably, people can distinguish between Duchenne and non-Duchenne smiles (e.g., 
Thibault, Gosselin, Brunel, & Hess, 2009). In addition to the activation of the zygomaticus 
major muscle which pulls up the lip corners, Duchenne smiles also include the activation 
of the orbicularis oculi which causes a contraction of the muscles at the corner of the eyes 
(Duchenne de Boulogne, 1990). Although Duchenne smiles are considered true signals 
of enjoyment, they can, however, also be displayed deliberately and without experienc-
ing enjoyment. Krumhuber and colleagues (Krumhuber & Manstead, 2009; Krumhuber, 
Likowski, & Wyers, 2014) showed that people can only distinguish between Duchenne and 
non-Duchenne smiles when these are spontaneously displayed. Moreover, spontaneous 
smiles were only rated as more genuine than deliberate in the case of Duchenne smiles.
On the other hand, research on detecting true happiness has demonstrated that people 
do not perform above chance level when judging the veracity of spontaneous and deliberate 
smiles (e.g., Hess & Kleck, 1994). Moreover, when people are deceiving or telling the truth 
about experiencing positive emotions, observers cannot accurately distinguish between truly 
felt and simulated smiles (e.g., Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991). So the results on the ability to 
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accurately distinguish true from deceptive positive emotional expressions seem mixed. The 
type of smiles studied in research on surface- and deep-level acting and on (non)Duchenne 
smiles is different from the type of true and false smiles studied in the deception literature. 
First, appearing friendly to others because a job requires one to do so is not identical to 
intentionally trying to mislead others. Second, although the (non)Duchenne smile stud-
ies provide insight into whether spontaneous and deliberate Duchenne or non-Duchenne 
smiles are regarded as more genuine, the research does not involve deception: Expressors of 
deliberate smiles are not asked to lie about their emotions, just to pose them. The research 
focusing directly on deception indicates that people are not able to accurately distinguish 
true and deceptive positive emotional expressions.
Few studies investigated whether observers are able to distinguish true from deceptive 
negative emotions. Porter and ten Brinke (2008) showed that deceivers show more inconsist-
encies when displaying deceptive negative emotions than deceptive positive emotions. Naive 
observers, however, did not perform above chance level when asked to judge the veracity 
of true and deceptive negative emotional expressions. This suggests that although deceivers 
are less successful in faking negative emotions, naive observers do not seem to notice.
It is conceivable, however, that when observers’ attention would be more on these emo-
tional deception cues, they could distinguish between liars and truth tellers. Shifting observ-
ers’ focus to these emotional cues can be done by asking them to rate the extent to which 
a target actually experiences an emotion. The use of such an indirect measure to detect 
deception hardly leads to higher accuracy rates. Bond, Levine, and Hartwig (2015) showed 
in their meta-analysis that only 4 out of 24 indirect measures outperform direct measures 
(cooperative, thinking hard, indifferent, and audible immediacy). The 20 indirect measures 
that did not outperform direct measures include rating the pleasantness, expressiveness, and 
relaxation of the face, nervousness and friendliness. One explanation for why some indirect 
measures, but not others, outperform direct measures is that only indirect measures that 
focus observers’ attention on deception cues that are useful can increase accuracy (Street 
& Richardson, 2015; Street & Vadillo, 2016).
An indirect measure asking to estimate the extent to which positive and negative emo-
tions are experienced by expressors was not previously investigated. We argue that such an 
indirect measure enable observers to pick up on the fact that deceivers show more incon-
sistencies when expressing deceptive negative emotions than when expressing deceptive 
positive emotions (Porter & ten Brinke, 2008). Thus, we hypothesize that observers are 
better able to distinguish between deceptive and true negative emotional expressions than 
deceptive and true positive emotional expressions on an indirect emotion deception detect-
ing measure. Furthermore, we anticipate that participants would be less able to accurately 
distinguish liars and truth tellers on a direct deception detecting measure, regardless which 
emotions are expressed.
To investigate our hypotheses, two studies were conducted in which participants watched 
video fragments of targets either lying or telling the truth about experiencing positive or 
negative emotions. We assessed people’s ability to distinguish true emotional expressions 
from deceptive emotional expressions in two ways: directly, by asking participants to what 
extent they think that targets were telling the truth or lying, and indirectly by asking par-
ticipants which specific emotions the targets experienced. As a within-subject design was 
used in both studies, Hedges’s gav is reported to correct for overestimation of effect sizes 




Participants were 53 (38 women) students of Leiden University (Mage = 23.64, range: 18–51). 
They were randomly assigned to a 2 (deception condition: lie vs. truth) x 2 (expressed 
emotions: positive vs. negative) within-subjects design. They received 2 euros or credits 
for participation. Sample size was a result of terminating data collection after one week (as 
was decided beforehand).
Procedure
Participants watched eight video fragments, in which targets were lying or telling the truth 
(see Materials). After each fragment, participants responded on a 7-point scale whether 
they thought the target was telling the truth (direct measure; 1 = not at all, 7 = very much).1 
Then, participants estimated to what extent they thought the target experienced specific 
emotions while telling the story (indirect measurement). Thus, they were not asked to rate 
the displayed emotion; but how they thought the target actually felt. The emotions tense, 
enthusiastic, pleased, worried, irritated, angry, confused, cheerful, dreary, happy, sad, and 
mad were rated on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much; Stel et al., 2010). Because 
the aim of the study was to examine whether people can correctly infer emotions from 
nonverbal behaviors the fragments were displayed without sound.
Materials
Targets were eight students (Mage: 20.00, range: 18–24). Only female targets participated 
because women are more expressive than men (e.g., Wagner, MacDonald, & Manstead, 
1986). They received 2 euros or credits for participating. On the video a target expressed 
either true positive emotions, deceptive positive emotions, true negative emotions, or 
deceptive negative emotions. Before being recorded, the target watched either a positive 
film fragment (Jungle Book) or a negative fragment (Sophie’s Choice). After watching the 
video, targets’ positive and negative experienced emotions were measured by asking them to 
rate the extent to which they experienced 12 different emotions on a 7-point scale. Targets 
who watched the positive fragment felt more positive (M = 5.56, SD = 0.55) than negative 
(M = 2.53, SD = 0.56), while targets who watched the negative fragment felt more negative 
(M = 5.56, SD = 0.46) than positive (M = 1.19, SD = 0.38), ps < .01.2
Targets knew before the video that they were later asked to either lie or tell the truth. 
After the video, they received their instructions. Targets asked to tell the truth, were asked 
to tell the other participant (a naïve confederate) what they had just seen and how that 
made them feel. When asked to lie, they were asked to simulate positive emotions when 
they had seen the negative video and negative emotions when they had seen the positive 
video. Those who watched the positive fragment and were asked to lie, received a descrip-
tion of the negative fragment accompanied by a description of the emotions they would 
have experienced when watching this fragment. Those who watched the negative fragment 
and were asked to lie received a description of the positive fragment. All targets correctly 
carried out their lie or truth instructions.
Targets were told that the other participant was instructed to discover whether they 
were lying and it was their job to convince the participant of telling the truth. To raise the 
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stakes, they were told that the ability to convince others (when lying and when telling the 
truth) is relevant to their career as a psychologist and is related to being successful (as in 
Ekman & Friesen, 1974).
During the conversation with the other participant, the targets’ body and face were 
recorded with a camera hidden.3 The first minute of each recording was selected. Afterwards, 




A confirmatory principal components analysis on the judged emotion items4 revealed a fac-
tor for negative emotions, consisting of tense, worried, irritated, angry, confused, dreary, sad, 
and mad (α = .90). The second factor, positive emotions, consists of enthusiastic, pleased, 
cheerful, and happy (α = .90). Means for each factor were calculated and used for further 
analyses.
To test the hypothesis that participants are better able to accurately distinguish liars from 
truth tellers when inferring emotions from negative expressions than from positive expres-
sions, a 2 (deception condition: lie vs. truth) x 2 (expressed emotion: positive vs. negative) 
x 2 (judged emotion: positive vs. negative) within-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
was conducted (see Table 1 for means and contrast tests). Three significant main effects 
were found. First, the main effect for deception, F(1, 52) = 4.05, p = .05, 2p  = .07, Hedges’s 
gav = 0.17, indicated that participants rated liars (M = 3.49, SD = 0.29) as experiencing more 
intense emotions in general than truth tellers (M = 3.43, SD = 0.38). The main effect for 
expressed emotion, F(1, 52) = 56.50, p < .001, 2p = .52, Hedges’s gav = 0.79, indicated that 
participants inferred more intense emotions when the expressed emotion was positive 
(M = 3.60, SD = 0.32) than when it was negative (M = 3.32, SD = 0.38). The main effect 
for judged emotion, F(1, 52) = 102.61, p < .001, 2p = .66, Hedges’s gav = 2.23, showed that 
participants rated the targets as experiencing more positive (M = 4.09, SD = 0.53) than 
negative emotions (M = 2.82, SD = 0.59).
These effects were qualified by two-way interactions between deception condition and 
expressed emotion, F(1, 52) = 35.66, p < .001, 2p = .41, deception condition and judged 
emotion, F(1, 52) = 100.94, p < .001, 2p = .66, and expressed and judged emotion, F(1, 52) 
= 298.65, p < .001, 2p = .85. These 2-way interactions in turn, were qualified by a three-way 
Table 1. Means and standard deviations of participants’ ratings of the targets’ emotions by deception 
condition, expressed emotion and judged emotion of Study 1 (the higher the scores, the more attribut-
ed emotion 1 = totally not experienced, 7 = very much experienced).




Expressed emotion Judged emotion M SD M SD
Positive Positive 5.81a 0.65 4.30b 0.80
negative 1.65c 0.54 2.65d 0.82
negative Positive 3.13a 0.76 3.13a 0.90
negative 3.36a 0.94 3.63b 0.83
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interaction between deception condition, expressed emotion, and judged emotion, F(1, 52) 
= 48.19, p < .001, 2p = .48. To interpret this 3-way interaction, we conducted paired-samples 
t-tests for positive and negative expressed emotions.
Positive expressed emotions. When positive emotions were expressed, more positive emo-
tions were inferred for targets lying that they felt positive (M = 5.81, SD = 0.65) than for 
targets telling the truth about feeling positive (M = 4.30, SD = 0.80), t(52) = 13.78, p < .001, 
Hedges’s gav = −2.04. Furthermore, more negative emotions were inferred for targets telling 
the truth about feeling positive (M = 2.65, SD = 0.82) than for targets lying that they felt posi-
tive (M = 1.65, SD = 0.54), t(52) = 9.10, p < .001, Hedges’s gav = −1.42. Thus, participants were 
unable to accurately distinguish true positive emotions from deceptive positive emotions.
Negative expressed emotions. When negative emotions were expressed, more negative 
emotions were inferred for targets telling the truth about feeling negative (M  =  3.63, 
SD = 0.83) than for targets lying that they felt negative (M = 3.36, SD = 0.94), t(52) = 
2.41, p = .02, Hedges’s gav = 0.30. Participants did not differ in their inferences of positive 
emotions for targets telling the truth about feeling negative (M = 3.13, SD = 0.90) and 
for targets lying that they felt negative (M = 3.13, SD = 0.76), t(52) < 1, p = .97, Hedges’s 
gav = 0.00. Thus, participants did not distinguish liars from truth tellers who displayed 
negative emotional expressions when inferring positive emotions, but were able to distin-
guish liars from truth tellers who displayed negative emotional expressions when inferring 
negative emotions.
Direct measure
To test the expectation that participants would not accurately distinguish liars from truth 
tellers on a direct measure, regardless which emotions are expressed, a 2 (deception condi-
tion) x 2 (expressed emotion) within-subjects ANOVA was conducted with the dependent 
variable being the reverse-coded answer on the direct measure (i.e., participants’ inference 
that the target was telling the truth). Higher scores reflect more deception (see Table 2 
for means and contrast tests). Two significant main effects were found. The main effect 
of deception condition, F(1, 52) = 34.62, p < .001, 2p = .40, Hedges’s gav = −1.07, indicated 
that participants rated the targets who were telling the truth as more deceitful (M = 4.21, 
SD = 0.87) than those who were lying (M = 3.20, SD = 0.98). The main effect for expressed 
emotion, F(1, 52) = 5.32, p = .03, 2p = .09, Hedges’s gav = 0.40, showed that participants rated 
targets who expressed negative emotions as more deceitful (M = 3.89, SD = 0.89) than 
Table 2. Means and standard deviations of participants’ ratings of the targets’ deception judgment 
by deception condition and expressed emotion of Study 1 (the higher the scores, the more deceitful, 
1 = totally not deceitful, 7 = very much deceitful).




  M SD M SD
Positive 3.08a 1.30 3.97b 1.20
negative 3.32b 1.17 4.45c 1.15
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those who expressed positive emotions (M = 3.53, SD = 0.89). As expected, there was no 
interaction between deception condition and expressed emotion, F < 1, 2p = .01. The effect 
size (Hedges’s gav) of the differences between liars and truth tellers for positive expressed 
emotions was −0.70 and for negative expressed emotions −0.96. Thus, participants made 
an inaccurate distinction between liars and truth tellers, regardless the expressed emotion: 
liars were rated as more truthful than truth tellers.
Study 2
Participants in Study 1 were more accurate in inferring deceptive and true negative emo-
tional expressions than deceptive and true positive emotional expressions. This was found 
only when asking participants to infer negative emotions for liars and truth tellers, not 
when inferring positive emotions and not when they directly rated whether they thought 
the target was telling the truth. The aim of Study 2 was to replicate these findings. Also, we 
increased the number of fragments to increase generalizability of the results.
Method
Participants and design
Using snowball sampling, 80 (52 women, Mage: 24.59, range: 18–63) students and nonstu-
dents participated voluntarily. They were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (decep-
tion condition: lie vs. truth) × 2 (expressed emotion: positive vs. negative) within-subjects 
design. Sample size was a result of terminating data collection after two weeks (as was 
decided beforehand).
Procedure
The procedure was similar to Study 1, except for a few changes. First, we added four video 
fragments to the fragments used in Study 1. So we had twelve different fragments in total, 
three of each category. Again, targets who watched the positive fragment felt more posi-
tive (M = 5.25, SD = 0.85) than negative (M = 2.15, SD = 0.74), while targets who watched 
the negative fragment felt more negative (M = 5.19, SD = 0.68) than positive (M = 1.46, 
SD = 0.60), ps < .001 (See note 2). Second, we extended our direct measure. In addition 
to rating to what extent they thought targets were telling the truth, participants now also 
rated to what extent they thought targets were lying (7-point scale, [1 = not at all, 7 = very 
much]. Third, we adjusted our indirect measure using more emotion items that are rele-
vant to deception (i.e., frightened, fearful, anxious, nervous, penitential, regretful, guilty, 
repentant, sad, angry, tense, worried, irritated, confused, enthusiastic, pleased, cheerful, 
and happy; adjusted from Stel, Van Dijk, & Olivier, 2009).
Results and discussion
Indirect measure
Again, a confirmatory principal components analysis (See note 4) revealed a factor for neg-
ative emotions (frightened, fearful, anxious, nervous, penitential, regretful, guilty, repentant, 
sad, angry, tense, worried, irritated, and confused, α = .96) and a factor for positive emotions 
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(enthusiastic, pleased, cheerful, and happy, α = .92). Means for each factor were calculated 
and used for further analyses.
A 2 (deception condition: lie vs. truth) × 2 (expressed emotion: positive vs. negative)  ×  2 
(judged emotion: positive vs. negative) within-subjects ANOVA was conducted (see Table 
3 for means and contrast tests). A main effect of expressed emotion, F(1, 79) = 75.48, 
p <  .001, 2p = .49, Hedges’s gav = 1.05, indicated that participants rated targets expressing 
positive emotions as experiencing more intense emotions (M = 3.64, SD = 0.51) than targets 
expressing negative emotions (M = 3.03, SD = 0.63). A main effect of judged emotion, F(1, 
79) = 196.93, p < .001, 2p = .71, Hedges’s gav = 1.19, indicated that participants inferred more 
positive (M = 3.75, SD = 0.62) than negative (M = 2.92, SD = 0.75) emotions for the targets.
Furthermore, we observed three significant 2-way interactions: a deception condition 
x expressed emotion interaction, F(1, 79) = 7.60, p = .01, 2p = .09, a deception condition x 
judged emotion interaction, F(1, 79) = 74.47, p < .001, 2p = .49, and an expressed emotion 
x judged emotion interaction, F(1, 79) = 376.98, p < .001, 2p = .83. These interaction effects 
were qualified by a 3-way interaction between deception condition, expressed emotion, and 
judged emotion, F(1, 79) = 28.79, p < .001, 2p = .27. To interpret this 3-way interaction, we 
conducted paired-samples t-tests for positive and negative expressed emotions.
Positive expressed emotions. When positive emotions were expressed, more positive emo-
tions were inferred for targets lying that they felt positive (M = 5.26, SD = 0.79) than for 
targets telling the truth about feeling positive (M = 4.46, SD = 0.95), t(79) = −7.64, p < .001, 
Hedges’s gav = −0.91. Furthermore, more negative emotions were inferred for targets telling 
the truth about feeling positive (M = 2.72, SD = 0.87) than for targets lying about feeling 
positive (M = 2.12, SD = 0.83), t(79) = 8.56, p < .001, Hedges’s gav = −0.70. Thus, as in Study 
1, participants were unable to accurately distinguish true positive emotions from deceptive 
positive emotions.
Negative expressed emotions. When negative emotions were expressed, more negative emo-
tions were inferred for targets telling the truth about feeling negative (M = 3.54, SD = 0.93) 
than for those lying that they felt negative (M = 3.29, SD = 0.91), t(79) = 3.40, p = .001, 
Hedges’s gav = 0.27. Participants did not differ in their inferences of positive emotions for 
targets telling the truth about feeling negative (M = 2.64, SD = 0.95) and targets lying that 
they felt negative (M = 2.64, SD = 0.88), t(79)< 1, p = .98, Hedges’s gav = 0.00. Thus, as in 
Study 1, participants did not distinguish liars from truth tellers who displayed negative 
Table 3. Means and standard deviations of participants’ ratings of the targets’ emotions by deception 
condition, expressed emotion and judged emotion of Study 2 (the higher the scores, the more attribut-
ed emotion, 1 = totally not experienced, 7 = very much experienced).




Expressed emotion Judged emotion M SD M SD
Positive Positive 5.26a 0.79 4.46b 0.95
negative 2.12c 0.83 2.72d 0.87
negative Positive 2.64a 0.88 2.64a 0.95
negative 3.29b 0.91 3.54c 0.93
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emotional expressions when inferring the targets’ positive emotions. They were able to 
distinguish liars from truth tellers who displayed negative emotional expressions when 
inferring the targets’ negative emotions.
Direct measure
The two questions asking to what extent the targets was telling the truth and lying were 
highly correlated (−.86). Therefore, both questions were averaged after recoding the truth 
question (α = .92).
A 2 (deception condition: lie vs. truth) × 2 (expressed emotion: positive vs. negative) 
ANOVA was conducted with this average judgment as a dependent variable (see Table 4  
for means and contrast tests). A main effect of deception condition, F(1, 79) = 19.17, p < .001, 

2
p = .20, Hedges’s gav = −0.64, indicated that truth tellers were evaluated as more deceitful 
(M = 3.87, SD = 0.65) than liars (M = 3.44, SD = 0.69). A main effect of expressed emotion, 
F(1, 79) = 48.11, p <  .001, 2p =  .38, Hedges’s gav = 1.04, indicated that targets expressing 
negative emotions were evaluated as more deceitful (M = 4.01, SD = 0.67) than targets 
expressing positive emotions (M = 3.29, SD = 0.70). Finally, a marginally significant interac-
tion between deception condition and expressed emotion, F(1, 79) = 3.89, p = .052, 
2
p = .05, 
showed that truth tellers were more strongly evaluated as deceitful compared with liars 
when they expressed negative emotions (respectively, M = 4.32, SD = 0.90 vs. M = 3.71, 
SD = 0.86), t(79) = 4.80, p < .001, Hedges’s gav = −0.69, than when they expressed positive 
emotions (respectively, M = 3.41, SD = 0.96 vs. M = 3.17, SD = 0.93), t(79) = 1.71, p = .09, 
Hedges’s gav = −0.25. In sum, as in Study 1, participants could not accurately distinguish 
between truth tellers and liars on a direct measure, regardless which emotion was expressed.
General discussion
Our participants were more accurate in detecting deception when negative than when 
positive emotions were expressed. This effect was found when observers judged deception 
indirectly, by inferring emotions felt by liars and truth tellers. This effect was not found 
when observers judged deception directly, by asking to what extent they thought the target 
was telling the truth or lying.
Our findings replicate the findings of previous studies investigating detecting decep-
tion in showing that it is hard to detect from positive nonverbal expressions whether the 
expressed emotion is true or false (e.g., Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991). Our results also cor-
roborate the results on negative expressions of Porter and ten Brinke (2008): In their study, 
Table 4. Means and standard deviations of participants’ ratings of the targets’ deception judgment by 
deception condition and expressed emotion of Study 2 (the higher the scores, the more deceitful, 1 = to-
tally not deceitful, 7 = very much deceitful).
note: Means with noncommon subscripts differ significantly (p < .05) within each column and row. furthermore, the posi-




  M SD M SD
Positive 3.17a 0.93 3.41a 0.96
negative 3.71b 0.86 4.32c 0.90
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observers could also not distinguish between true and deceptive negative emotional expres-
sions on a direct measure. Importantly, we extend previous studies by showing that when 
measuring detection deception indirectly with an emotion measure, observers are more 
accurate in judging true and deceptive negative expressions than true and deceptive positive 
expressions.
Our studies do not give insight into what exactly caused the observers to be able to 
distinguish on an indirect emotion measure between liars and truth tellers who expressed 
negative emotions, while not being able to do so when liars and truth tellers expressed 
positive emotions. As observers are more efficient in detecting negative emotions in gen-
eral (e.g., Fox et al., 2000), it is possible that observers are better assessors when estimating 
persons’ true emotions from negative than from positive emotional expressions. We explain 
our results, however, differently. Porter and ten Brinke (2008) showed that deceivers show 
more inconsistencies in displaying deceptive negative emotions than deceptive positive 
emotions. Although observers are not able to pick up on these inconsistencies when asked to 
directly judge deception (Porter & ten Brinke, 2008), we argued and showed that observers 
do pick up on this when asked to judge deception indirectly using an emotion measure.5 We 
do not argue that this is due to unconscious processes (see also Moi & Shanks, 2015), but 
to a shift in focus to deception cues that are present. Asking observers to estimate targets’ 
emotions made them focus more on emotions, which increased people’s detecting deception 
accuracy as emotional deception cues are present. This explanation is in line with Street 
and Richardson’s findings (2016) that observers focus more on diagnostic deception cues 
when using an indirect measure, whereas observers integrate a set of diagnostic and non-
diagnostic cues when using a direct measure, which reduces deception detection accuracy.
Alternatively, the indirect emotion measure could have focused observers more on visual 
and affective details that may differ between liars and truth tellers. Although all liars and 
truth tellers watched a video, liars were asked to lie about this and received written infor-
mation about another video they could use for their lie. Thus, as in real life, liars and truth 
tellers differed in the richness of the source they used for their story, which could cause 
differences in the frequency of visual, auditory, spatial, temporal, cognitive and affective 
details in their statements (e.g., Logue, Book, Frosina, Huizinga, & Amos, 2015). Although 
the videos in our studies were presented without sound to eliminate such alternative verbal 
explanations, it is still possible that the richness in verbal details may have caused non-
verbal changes as well (e.g., Logue et al., 2015). An indirect emotion measure could have 
shifted observers’ attention to these deception cues, leading to increased detecting deception 
accuracy. This alternative explanation, however, cannot explain why the indirect emotion 
measure increased accuracy only for negative emotions. After all, the richness would also 
differ for liars and truth tellers expressing positive emotions.
Another alternative explanation is mood. Mood can be elicited when watching positive or 
negative facial expressions (Lundqvist, 1995) and has been shown to influence information 
processing. People in a positive mood rely more on heuristics, while people in a negative 
mood engage in effortful and cautious processing (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990; 
Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994). One might reason that this cautiousness could also 
(partly) explain why people are more accurate when inferring emotions for a person display-
ing negative expression. Although we can envisage such a process, it should be noted that 
Ambady and Gray (2002) demonstrated that a negative mood does not increase accuracy 
for social judgments of nonverbal behaviors. The possibility of negative mood effects on 
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detection deception accuracy might have been higher if we would have allowed for verbal 
communication (Reinhard & Schwarz, 2012).
At this point it is also appropriate to discuss the effect sizes we observed. In particular, 
note that the effect sizes of the direct measures were lower than the effect sizes of the direct 
measures that have been reported in previous meta-analyses. The meta-analyses of Bond 
and DePaulo (2006) and Bond et al. (2015) obtained small to medium positive effect sizes. 
In our studies, for both positive and negative expressed emotions, we obtained small to 
large negative effect sizes, indicating that observers inaccurately distinguished between liars 
and truth tellers. This might suggest that the direct measure decreases detection deception 
instead of the indirect emotion measure increasing deception (Levine & Bond, 2014).
It should be noted, however, that the effect size of the indirect emotion measure for pos-
itive emotional expressions, however, is also large and negative as our direct measure, while 
the indirect measures in the meta-analysis of Bond et al. (2015) obtained zero to medium 
positive effect sizes. So the effect sizes of our studies for both direct and indirect measures 
are not comparable to the effect sizes of the meta-analyses. This suggests that it may have 
been harder to detect deception from the materials we used in our studies compared with 
other studies. A first reason for this could be that in our studies observers received visual 
information only, while the majority of studies in meta-analyses included audio and visual 
information (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Secondly, in our studies, the content of the lies and 
truths concerned emotions. It is possible that those type of lies and truths are harder to detect 
than others. If more unreliable and contradicting cues are present when expressing true and 
deceptive emotions, detecting deception accuracy is decreased (Street & Richardson, 2015). 
Also, a direct measure using a multipoint rating scales decreases lie-truth discrimination 
ability (Bond & DePaulo, 2006).
To conclude, when asked directly, lies on experienced emotions remained undiscovered 
regardless which emotions are expressed. However, our findings show that people are better 
able to distinguish liars from truth tellers when inferring emotions of negative expressive 
nonverbal behaviors than of positive expressions. The ability to distinguish true from decep-
tive emotions thus depends on both the valence of emotions (positive versus negative) and 
assessment procedure (direct vs. indirect emotion measure).
Notes
1.  The direct question was not measured on a binary scale because we felt that honesty judgments 
such as these are not binary in nature, i.e., people may be less or more convinced about 
someone telling the truth. Using a 7-point scale allowed a more sensitive measurement than 
a yes/no judgment. Studies that also used a multipoint rating scale showed decreased lie-truth 
discrimination ability compared to studies that used a binary measure (Bond & DePaulo, 
2006). Also, the use of a 7-point scale allowed for a better comparison with our indirect 
emotion measure (Van ‘t Veer, 2015).
2.  When comparing positive and negative emotions for each target separately, we observed 
that this difference between emotions depending on video was present for each person (i.e., 
each target who watched the positive film fragment reported to experience more positive 
than negative emotions and each target who watched the negative film fragment reported to 
experience more negative than positive emotions).
3.  After the interaction, liars and truth tellers were asked to what extent they thought they were 
successful in convincing the other student for having told the truth. There were no differences 
in self-rated ability to convince between liars and truth tellers, neither between persons who 
expressed positive or negative emotions, or a combination of these factors, Fs < 1.
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4.  Exploratory principal components analyses on the emotion items in Studies 1 and 2 yielded 
three distinct factors based on Eigenvalues greater than 1. The first factor consisted of all the 
negative emotion items, except for the item tense in Study 1. The second factor consisted 
of all the positive emotion items, except for the item pleased in Study 2. The third factor in 
Study 1 consisted of the emotion item tense and in Study 2 pleased. Therefore (confirmatory) 
principal components analyses in both studies were done with two fixed factors.
5.  EMFACS coding the twelve video fragments we used did not provide conclusive evidence 
as more videos are needed to be able to show differences, if any, in emotional inconsistency 
between senders.
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